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Of Butchers, Bakers, and Casket Makers: St. Joseph 
Abbey v. Castille and the Fifth Circuit’s Rejection of 
Pure Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State 
Interest 
INTRODUCTION 
Cutting timber, brewing beer, and making wine—the Benedictine 
monks strive to maintain a life of simplicity by engaging in various 
common trades to financially support their monastic communities.1 
Hurricane Katrina forced the monks of St. Joseph Abbey (Abbey) to 
find a new trade; the monks could no longer cut and sell timber 
since their supply was washed away by the storm.2 As a result, 
turning to their century-old tradition of casket making, the Abbey’s 
monks began selling their handmade wooden caskets customarily 
used to bury their brethren.3 For the monks, the art of casket 
making was the clear solution, allowing them to maintain a quiet 
lifestyle in furtherance of the order’s motto ora et labora—“prayer 
and work”;4 however, in their quest to become more Christ-like, 
the monks became monastic-clad criminals. Unbeknownst to the 
Abbey, the monks were operating in contravention of Louisiana 
law, which requires that all intrastate casket sales to the public be 
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 1. See Free the Monks and Free Enterprise: Challenging Louisiana’s Casket 
Cartel, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/louisiana-caskets-background-2, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NLP9-Z6PY (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (“Selling 
caskets helps the monks pay for food and healthcare, and helps them share their 
belief in the noble simplicity of life and death.”). 
 2. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013). 
 3. Id. (“In years past, the Abbey’s timberland provided a source of income. 
After Hurricane Katrina destroyed its timber, the Abbey began looking for other 
revenue sources. For generations the Abbey has made simple wooden caskets to 
bury its monks. Public interest in the Abbey’s caskets increased after two 
bishops were buried in Abbey caskets in the 1990s. Seeing potential in this 
demand, the Abbey invested $200,000 in ‘St. Joseph Woodworks,’ managed by 
Mark Coudrain, a deacon of the Church and an employee of the Abbey. The 
business plan was simple. St. Joseph Woodworks offered one product—caskets 
in two models, ‘monastic’ and ‘traditional,’ priced at $1,500 and $2,000 
respectively, significantly lower than those offered by funeral homes.”). 
 4. Free the Monks and Free Enterprise: Challenging Louisiana’s Casket 
Cartel, supra note 1. As a Benedictine Monastery, the monks of St. Joseph 
Abbey follow the teachings of Saint Benedict of Nursia, a sixth-century 
Christian monk. Id. “This ancient tradition is encapsulated in the Benedictine 
motto ‘ora et labora’ (prayer and work). The monastic life at Saint Joseph 
Abbey is one of liturgical prayer, the singing of psalms, simple labor, education, 
and hospitality toward those seeking a contemplative respite from the world.” 
Id. 




made by a state-licensed funeral director at a state-licensed funeral 
home.5 The Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors 
(State Board), the entity responsible for enforcing the relevant 
statutes and regulations, caught wind of the rising enterprise and 
ordered the monks to shut down their casket-making business or 
face heavy fines, jail time, and an injunctive lawsuit.6  
In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, the Abbey sought to enjoin the 
State Board from enforcing the casket regulations, contending that 
the Louisiana laws violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.7 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana found the casket regulations unconstitutional 
on equal protection and due process grounds.8 On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.9 The Fifth Circuit held 
that mere economic protection of the funeral industry, absent a 
connection to the advancement of the public good or general 
welfare, is not a legitimate state interest.10 Although the monks 
rejoiced in their Fifth Circuit victory, the State Board swiftly 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to overturn the Fifth 
                                                                                                             
 5. See LA REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831(33), (39), § 848 (2011). 
 6. See id. § 37:848; Castille, 712 F.3d at 217–19. 
 7. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 
712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fourteenth Amendment provides:  
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 8. See Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (holding it “unconstitutional to 
require those persons who intend solely to manufacture and sell caskets be subject 
to the licensing requirements for funeral directors and funeral establishments”). 
The district court found that this requirement was in contravention of the Due 
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational 
basis for the state to “require persons who seek to enter into the retailing of caskets 
to undergo the training and expense necessary to comply with these rules.” Id. at 
151. In addition, the court found that “there [was] nothing in the licensing 
procedures that bestows any benefit to the public in the context of the retail sale of 
caskets,” and “[t]he license [had] no bearing on the manufacturing and sale of 
caskets.” Id. at 151. The court believed the “sole reason for these laws [was] the 
economic protection of the funeral industry which reason the Court has previously 
found not to be a valid government interest standing alone to provide a 
constitutionally valid reason for these provisions.” Id.  
 9. Castille, 712 F.3d at 217. 
 10. Id. at 226–27. 




Circuit’s ruling.11 However, the Supreme Court rejected the State 
Board’s petition.12 
By denying the State Board’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme 
Court remained silent regarding the constitutionality of Louisiana’s 
casket laws, and thus the decision holding the law unconstitutional 
became final. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has a colorful history 
of reviewing economic legislation very similar to Louisiana’s casket 
regulations.13 Supreme Court jurisprudence has touched on the 
various mechanisms used to protect individuals’ economic liberties, 
such as the freedom to pursue a livelihood.14 In the nineteenth 
century, many Supreme Court justices considered such economic 
liberties to be natural rights.15 Throughout the nineteenth century 
until the 1930s, also known as the “Lochner Era,”16 the Court 
closely scrutinized economic laws and interpreted the Due Process 
Clause as protecting the freedom of contract.17 Consequently, 
during that time the Supreme Court invalidated most economic 
                                                                                                             
 11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 
423 (2013) (No. 13-91). Members of the State Board filed a petition for 
certiorari on July 17, 2013, requesting review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. Id. 
The Board urged the Court to allow the writ, because there is a circuit split 
regarding whether pure economic protectionism is a legitimate governmental 
interest under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 35. 
 12. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICES 622 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011) (“The Supreme Court’s 
protection of economic liberties has varied enormously over time.”).  
 15. Id. (“In the early nineteenth century, the Court invoked natural law 
principles to protect property rights.”). Justice Chase “expressed the view that 
the government could neither violate the provisions of the Constitution nor 
infringe rights that are part of the natural law.” Id. at 624. He stated, “there are 
certain vital principles in our free Republic governments, which will determine 
and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power . . . An ACT of 
the legislature . . . contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, 
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Id. at 625. 
 16. The era was named after the famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) (finding that a law restricting the number of hours bakers could 
work was unconstitutional). 
 17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 630. Throughout the “Lochner Era,” 
the Supreme Court stated that:  
[F]reedom of contract is a basic right protected as liberty and property 
rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . 
the Court [has] said that liberty includes the right ‘to enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential’ to carrying 
out a trade or profession. 
Id. The Court said that the state could limit the freedom of contract only to serve 
a valid police purpose, and it was the judiciary’s responsibility to closely 
scrutinize such legislation to make sure it served a valid police purpose. Id. at 
630–31. 




legislation as illegitimate interferences with the freedom of 
contract.18  
However, in the 1930s, the Court changed course and rejected 
the protection of freedom of contract as a liberty interest under the 
Due Process Clause.19 The Court has not invalidated a single piece 
of economic legislation on due process or equal protection grounds 
since, opting for a more deferential, rational basis review of state 
laws.20 Now, in order to satisfy the outermost limits of due process 
and equal protection, economic legislation must be supported by a 
legitimate governmental purpose, and the state’s interest must be 
rationally related to the regulation.21 Applying these minimal due 
process requirements, lower courts now often defer to the judgment of 
state legislatures as to the reasonableness of legislation.22 Yet, the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses maintain necessary 
safeguards for economic liberties.23 Despite states’ possible 
protectionist motivations, courts scrutinize economic laws to find 
some discernible connection to a legitimate state interest, such as 
protecting public health or safety.24 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph Abbey v. 
Castille, the Tenth Circuit applied the rational basis standard of 
review and upheld a state regulatory scheme that was strikingly 
similar to the Louisiana regulations restricting the sale of caskets.25 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 632 (“[T]he Court followed the principles articulated in Lochner, 
finding many laws unconstitutional as interfering with freedom of contract. It is 
estimated that almost 200 state laws were declared unconstitutional as violating 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 19. Id. at 639–40. 
 20. Id. at 641. “The legal inquiry using the rational basis test is two-fold. 
The Court must determine (1) whether the regulation has a legitimate 
government purpose; and (2) whether there is a rational relationship between 
that purpose and the means chosen by the State to accomplish it.” St. Joseph 
Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 21. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 156. 
 22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 642. The Supreme Court stressed the 
need for judicial deference to legislative choices in an opinion upholding a state 
economic regulation. The Court found that it is for the legislatures, not the 
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  
 23. Although the Supreme Court has adopted a policy of great deference to 
state economic regulations, legislation must still meet the requirements of the 
rational review standard. See supra note 20.  
 24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 641 (“The government’s purpose can 
be any goal not prohibited by the Constitution.”). 
 25. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act did not violate the Due Process 
Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Like the 
Louisiana statutes, the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act requires that 




The Tenth Circuit was satisfied with the state’s sole interest in 
protecting the funeral industry.26 As a result, a circuit split emerged 
with the Sixth Circuit, which previously invalidated a nearly 
identical casket regulation on equal protection and due process 
grounds.27 Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit explicitly 
rejected economic protectionism as a legitimate rationale for 
funeral director licensure requirements.28  
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille 
comes at a seismic moment. In light of the circuit split, the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision demonstrates that neither precedent nor 
constitutional principles protect pure economic protectionism as a 
legitimate state interest.29 More importantly, however, the Fifth 
Circuit breathed life back into rational basis review, a test 
commonly misperceived as a “virtual rubber stamp” and “judicial 
abdication.”30 This Note proposes that courts should look to the 
Fifth Circuit as a revival of the rational basis standard of review in 
the due process and equal protection contexts rather than a rebirth 
of Lochnerian principles and judicial activism. Part I of this Note 
explains the constitutional principles underlying the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
traces the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 
context of economic legislation. Part II examines the circuit split 
between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits on the issue of whether pure 
economic protectionism is a legitimate government purpose. Part 
III then discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph Abbey v. 
Castille. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the opinion, and Part V 
considers the implications of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and its 
effects on future economic legislation, particularly in Louisiana. 
                                                                                                             
 
any person engaged in the sale of caskets be a licensed funeral director operating 
out of a funeral establishment. Id. at 1212. 
 26. See id. at 1222–23 (holding that “the FSLA need only be rationally related 
to the legitimate state interest of intrastate industry protection. There can be no 
serious dispute that the FSLA is ‘very well tailored’ to protecting the intrastate 
funeral-home industry”). 
 27. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act’s prohibition on sale of caskets 
by anyone not licensed as a funeral director violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 28. Id. at 224 (“Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete 
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”).  
 29. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013).  
 30. Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the 
Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 607 (2000). 




I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”31 The term “due process of 
law” originated in England to “secure the subject against the arbitrary 
action of the crown.”32 The due process requirement has a similar 
effect on the legislatures, both federal and state, in the United States.33 
Initially, the Due Process Clause was interpreted merely as a 
procedural limitation, requiring states to provide fair procedures 
before depriving individuals of certain interests.34 Eventually, 
however, the Due Process Clause developed a substantive 
component. The doctrine of substantive due process protects persons 
against arbitrary state laws that exceed the limits of the government’s 
authority.35  
A. The Birth of Substantive Due Process  
Shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use the Due Process Clause 
to protect economic liberties from governmental interference.36 
The Slaughter-House Cases involved a challenge to a Louisiana 
law that granted a private company a 25-year monopoly in the 
livestock landing and slaughterhouse business and required 
persons to pay a fixed fee for using the facilities to slaughter 
animals.37 Several butchers attacked the constitutionality of the law 
as a violation of due process and a deprivation of their rights to 
pursue a livelihood.38 The butchers’ argument formulated the 
doctrine now known as “substantive due process” and provided 
that the Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights 
from government limitations, including the right to choose a 
profession.39 However, the majority rejected the butchers’ claims.40 
                                                                                                             
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 32. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885).  
 33. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of 
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 313 (1991) (“The touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (quoting 
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889))). 
 34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 626. 
 35. Levinson, supra note 33, at 314 n.7. 
 36. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80–81 (1872).  
 37. Id. at 59–61. 
 38. Id. at 43. 
 39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 626. 
 40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 82. 




Refusing to inject substance into the Due Process Clause, the 
Supreme Court declared:  
[U]nder no construction of that provision that we have ever 
seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint 
imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their 
trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a 
deprivation of property within the meaning of that 
provision.41  
Although the majority was adamant in its rejection of 
substantive due process doctrine, Justice Bradley countered it with 
a powerful dissent interpreting the Due Process Clause as a 
mechanism to prevent states from adopting arbitrary laws.42 Justice 
Bradley interpreted the words “liberty” and “property” in the Due 
Process Clause as protecting the right to practice a trade, 
occupation, or profession.43 He believed that a statute prohibiting 
citizens from pursuing a lawful employment deprived citizens of 
both liberty and property without due process of law.44 Justice 
Bradley’s dissent espoused principles of natural law, a philosophy 
embraced by many of the Framers of the Constitution, and set the 
stage for a new era of jurisprudence where the Supreme Court 
would rigorously review the substance of state economic 
regulations.45  
In Munn v. Illinois, the Railroad Commission Cases, and Mugler 
v. Kansas, the Supreme Court upheld various economic regulations 
yet maintained Bradley-like beliefs in natural rights.46 Although the 
Court validated the constitutionality of the laws, the Court also 
recognized due process restraints on the government’s regulatory 
power.47 In Munn, the Court upheld a state law that set maximum rates 
for grain-storage warehouses; however, the Court simultaneously 
suggested that a state regulation may be invalidated as a violation of 
due process “[i]f no state of circumstances could exist to justify such 
a statute.”48 Thereafter, in the Railroad Commission Cases, the 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 81. 
 42. See id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a law which 
prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from 
following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty 
as well as property, without due process of law”).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 627. 
 46. Id. at 628–29. 
 47. See id. at 628. 
 48. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132–33 (1877) (“If no state of circumstances 
could exist to justify such a statute, then we may declare this one void, because 
is excess of the legislative power of the State. But if it could, we must presume it 




Court sustained a state law regulating railroad rates but alluded to 
the potential fatality of such laws under the Due Process Clause, 
warning that the “power to regulate is not a power to destroy.”49 
Finally, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court upheld a state ban on 
alcoholic beverages but indicated that legislation is valid only if it 
truly serves a valid state police purpose.50 The Court said: 
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to 
protect the public health, the public morals, or the public 
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or 
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law, it is the duty of the courts so to adjudge, and thereby 
give effect to the Constitution.51  
Justice Bradley’s dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, and the 
Supreme Court’s majority opinions in Munn v. Illinois, the Railroad 
Commission Cases, and Mugler v. Kansas, articulated the Supreme 
Court’s evolving interpretation of the Due Process Clause as not 
only a bundle of procedural limitations, but also a limitation upon 
the substantive power of state legislatures to regulate various areas 
of economic life.52 These cases set the stage for the “Lochner era,” a 
period known for the Supreme Court’s suspicions of state regulations 
and the inevitable fatality of most economic legislation.53  
B. The Lochner Era 
Lochner v. New York ushered in a regime characterized by the 
widespread invalidation of state economic regulations on substantive 
                                                                                                             
 
did. Of the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of legislative 
power, the legislature is the exclusive judge.”). 
 49. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). 
 50. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). A Kansas law prohibited 
the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 657. Mugler was arrested 
for making and selling beer. The Court found that the Kansas prohibition did not 
infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights, because it falls within the state’s 
police powers. Id. at 661–63.  
 51. Id. at 661.  
 52. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 627–29. 
 53. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) (“Legal scholars and 
historians have generally depicted the Lochner era as a deviant period during 
which the Supreme Court broke from the constitutionalism that the Marshall Court 
established and the New Deal Court restored. They maintain that the Lochner era 
Court, which struck down much legislation affecting industrial regulation, strayed 
from the American constitutional tradition by underconstruing the scope of 
congressional power and overprotecting private property.”). 




due process grounds.54 Lochner gave hope to the butchers whose 
challenges were rejected in the Slaughter-House Cases and defined a 
new formulation of due process analysis.55 Accepting freedom of 
contract as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court carefully 
scrutinized laws to ensure that those laws were supported by valid 
governmental objectives and that the regulations sufficiently achieved 
those objectives.56  
In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law limiting 
the hours that a bakery employee could work as an undue 
interference with the bakers’ liberty of contract, a fundamental 
right protected by the guarantees of the Due Process Clause.57 The 
Supreme Court found that the government could only interfere with 
the freedom of contract to serve a valid police purpose, and it was 
the judiciary’s responsibility to closely scrutinize such legislation to 
ensure that it did.58 In examining the legislation, the Court asked 
whether the regulation was a “fair, reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of the police power of the State” or, rather, “an 
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right 
of the individual to his personal liberty.”59 The Court demanded 
such scrutiny of economic legislation, recognizing that many laws 
purporting to protect the public health or welfare were nothing more 
than self-serving economic measures to protect private interests.60 
Rejecting the government’s supposed goals of public health and 
safety, the Court refused to defer to the legislature’s findings of 
fact.61 Rather, the Court suspected that the state’s sole motive was to 
regulate labor conditions.62 Moreover, the Court determined that 
the goal of protecting bakers’ health could be satisfied by less 
restrictive measures, such as inspecting premises and requiring that 
wash rooms be furnished.63 
In contrast, Justice Harlan’s dissent found the state law 
constitutional and criticized the majority for failing to defer to the 
                                                                                                             
 54. See id. at 8, 14. 
 55. See id. at 92–93. 
 56. Id. at 16. 
 57. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 58. Id. at 68. 
 59. Id. at 56. 
 60. Id. at 64 (“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many 
of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police 
power for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, 
passed from other motives.”). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. at 62–63 (“In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover 
the connection between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and 
the healthful quality of the bread made by the workman.”). 
 63. Id. at 61. 




legislature.64 Deferring to the legislature’s findings, Justice Harlan 
accepted the maximum-hour regulation as a reasonable means to 
protect the health of bakers who were frequently exposed to flour 
dust and intense heat.65 In an equally vigorous dissent, Justice 
Holmes criticized the majority’s judicial activism, warning that “a 
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory.”66 Justice Holmes concluded that “liberty” in terms of due 
process should be found only to have been violated when “a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute 
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”67 
C. The Decline of Economic Substantive Due Process  
The reign of Lochner ended with the Court’s decision in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which flatly rejected freedom of contract 
as a fundamental right.68 The Supreme Court instead found that the 
government could regulate to serve a legitimate purpose, and the 
judiciary would defer to the legislature’s decision as long as it was 
reasonable.69 With the death of the freedom-of-contract doctrine in 
this context, the Due Process Clause survives to preserve and protect 
economic liberties. In a post-Lochner decision, the Supreme Court 
articulated that the “liberty component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due 
process right to choose one’s field of private employment, but a 
right which is nevertheless subject to reasonable government 
regulation.”70 Thus, freedom of contract is no longer protected as a 
fundamental right; economic liberties are still rights protected under 
the “liberty” provision of the Due Process Clause, but they are 
                                                                                                             
 64. See id. at 76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 65. Id. at 69–70. 
 66. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 76. 
 68. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state 
minimum wage law for women, finding a reasonable state interest in protecting 
the health of women and redressing women’s inferior bargaining power). 
What is this freedom [of contract]? The Constitution does not speak of 
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law. . . . [R]egulation which is 
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process. 
Id. at 391. 
 69. See id. at 393. 
 70. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999).  




subjected to a lesser degree of scrutiny than those that are 
fundamental.71 
After the Supreme Court abandoned freedom of contract as a 
fundamental right, it swept away the remnants of Lochner in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.72 The Court in Carolene Products 
formulated a more deferential, less-stringent procedure for analyzing 
economic regulations, yet maintained a threshold requirement of 
rationality.73 Emphasizing a need for deference to legislative 
choices, the Court applied a presumption of constitutionality and a 
minimum-rationality standard to legislation.74 The Court firmly 
declared that economic regulations should be upheld as long as there 
was some rational basis, and “any state of facts either known or 
which could reasonably be assumed” would be considered in 
support thereof.75 
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., the Supreme Court upheld the 
rational basis framework set forth in Carolene Products but relaxed 
judicial scrutiny of economic legislation even further.76 The Court 
upheld an Oklahoma statute that made it unlawful for any person not 
a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit eyeglass lenses into 
frames without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or 
optometrist.77 Encouraging judicial deference to legislative findings, 
the Court concluded that “the Oklahoma law may exact a needless, 
wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not 
the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
requirement.”78 Applying the rational basis test, the Court 
hypothesized justifications that the legislature may have considered 
to support the regulation.79 The Oklahoma law was more likely a 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (sustaining a 
federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of “filled” milk as a constitutional 
exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce). 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the [statute prohibiting the shipment 
of filled milk in interstate commerce] is to be presumed, for regulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge 
and experience of the legislators. 
Id. at 152. 
 73. Id. at 147–48. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 154.  
 76. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 77. See id. at 485. 
 78. Id. at 487. 
 79. Id.  




protectionist measure to maintain the business of optometrists and 
ophthalmologists rather than a desire to improve health; however, 
the Court found that the hypothetical justifications of public health 
satisfied the requirement of rationality.80  
In response to an era marked by the Court’s aggressive review 
of economic legislation, Carolene Products formulated a rational 
basis test for judicial review of economic legislation under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.81 The Supreme Court has 
since expressed numerous definitions and articulations of the 
rational basis requirement, giving rise to confusion surrounding its 
application in the context of economic legislation.82 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Despite the challenged regulations’ striking resemblance in both 
cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reached opposite conclusions 
regarding the constitutionality of legislation granting the exclusive 
right to sell caskets to funeral directors.83 The Sixth Circuit in 
Craigmiles v. Giles refused to accept the mere assertion of a 
legitimate government interest and determined that the licensing 
requirement was “nothing more than an attempt to prevent 
                                                                                                             
 
The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions 
when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation 
of the fitting of eyeglasses. Likewise, when it is necessary to duplicate 
a lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. But the 
legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough to 
require one in every case. Or the legislature may have concluded that 
eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but 
also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in 
frames and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a 
prescription from a medical expert. 
Id. 
 80. Id. at 487–88 (explaining that a “law need not be in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”). 
 81. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 82. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 808 (2006) (“[O]ne of the largest problems with the 
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actually two levels of rational basis review: good old-fashioned, deferential 
rational basis review and a more demanding, heightened version—one with 
‘teeth.’”).  
 83. See infra notes 84–85. 




economic competition.”84 Dissimilarly, the Tenth Circuit in 
Powers v. Harris swiftly accepted pure economic protectionism of 
the funeral industry as a legitimate state interest and upheld the 
casket regulations.85  
A. The Sixth Circuit: Craigmiles v. Giles 
Applying the rational basis framework set forth in Carolene 
Products, the Sixth Circuit invalidated a regulation limiting the 
retail sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors on equal 
protection and due process grounds and explicitly rejected 
economic favoritism as a legitimate rationale for the state licensure 
requirements.86 Under the rational basis standard of review, the 
key issue was whether the state had a rational basis for 
implementing the regulation.87 The state claimed that the licensure 
requirement promoted public health and safety and consumer 
protection.88  
Although public health and consumer protection are legitimate 
state interests, the court examined the evidence set forth in the 
record to evaluate the relationship between the law and the state’s 
purpose.89 Analyzing the public safety objective, the court 
emphasized the following facts: the state did not require the use of 
caskets in burials; there were no special requirements regarding the 
construction of caskets sold by funeral directors to distinguish 
them from caskets sold elsewhere; and none of the training 
received by funeral directors regarding caskets had anything to do 
with public health or safety.90 Turning to the consumer protection 
justification, the court found no evidence that consumers were 
treated any differently by funeral directors compared to other 
casket retailers.91 Considering the fact that caskets are usually the 
most expensive purchase in a funeral arrangement, the court found 
that the regulations actually hurt the consumer by reducing price 
competition and therefore simultaneously increasing casket prices.92 
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Considering the evidence directly contradicting the state’s 
reasoning of public health and safety and consumer protection, the 
court was unable to find a rational relation between the regulatory 
scheme and any legitimate state interest.93 The Sixth Circuit thus 
concluded that the attenuated rationalizations offered by the state 
came “close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old, 
unrefrigerated dead fish.’”94 Any conceivable legitimate state 
objective was repudiated by the very facts of the case, which the 
court could not ignore even under the most forgiving standards of 
the rational basis standard of review.95  
B. The Tenth Circuit: Powers v. Harris 
Two years after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Craigmiles v. 
Giles, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v. Harris created a 
circuit split.96 Refusing to follow the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld Oklahoma’s regulatory scheme restricting the 
retail sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors.97 The court held 
that “absent a violation of a specific constitutional provision or 
other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a 
legitimate state interest.”98 Upon finding a rational relationship 
between the casket regulation and the funeral directors’ interest in 
protecting the intrastate funeral home industry, the court ended its 
inquiry.99 The court cited to Supreme Court precedent to justify its 
reliance on economic protectionism—the protection of a particular 
group or industry from competition—as a valid purpose under 
rational basis analysis.100 In the concurring opinion, however, 
Judge Tymkovich rejected the majority’s view that pure economic 
protectionism is a legitimate state interest.101 Rather, Judge 
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 94. Id. at 225 (citation omitted). 
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the pretextual nature of the state’s proffered explanations for the [regulation].”). 
 96. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 97. See id. at 1211 (“The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act, 
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Tymkovich concurred in the holding because he found that the 
licensing scheme furthered a state interest in consumer protection.102  
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CASE: ST. JOSEPH ABBEY V. CASTILLE 
After the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers, the Fifth Circuit 
had an opportunity to choose a side in the circuit split discussed 
above in St. Joseph Abbey.103 St. Joseph Abbey involved a state 
casket regulation limiting the retail sales of caskets to state 
licensed funeral directors, which was strikingly similar to the 
regulatory schemes in Craigmiles and Powers.  
A. Factual and Procedural History  
In a search for an alternate source of revenue to support St. 
Joseph Abbey’s monastic community in Louisiana, the Abbey’s 
monks started “St. Joseph Woodworks,” which sold the Abbey’s 
traditional handmade caskets to the public at prices significantly 
lower than the prices of caskets sold by funeral homes.104 The 
monks did not realize that their small-scale, casket-making 
business was operating in violation of a Louisiana law until the 
State Board demanded that the monks stop selling their caskets.105 
The law at issue, the Louisiana Embalming and Funeral Directors 
Act, is a series of statutes and regulations enforced by the State 
Board that limits the intrastate sales of caskets to the public to state-
licensed funeral directors at state-licensed funeral homes.106 The 
regulatory scheme has two major components.107 First, a potential 
casket retailer must become a licensed funeral establishment.108 The 
licensure requirement of a funeral establishment requires building a 
layout parlor for third parties, a display room for six caskets, an 
arrangement room, and embalming facilities.109 Second, the funeral 
                                                                                                             
 
protectionism’ as a legitimate state interest furthered by Oklahoma’s funeral 
licensing scheme.”).  
 102. Id. at 1226–27. 
 103. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013). 
 104. See supra note 3. 
 105. See Castille, 712 F.3d at 217–18. 
 106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831–37:854 (2011). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. §§ 37:831(37), (39), 842(D). 
 109. Castille, 712 F.3d at 218. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:842(D)(3) 
(2011). 




establishment must employ a full-time funeral director.110 In order 
to become a funeral director, an individual must have a high school 
diploma or GED, earn 30 credit hours at an accredited college, and 
pass a test administered by the International Conference of Funeral 
Examining Boards.111  
St. Joseph Abbey sued members of the State Board, seeking 
“declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of 
Louisiana’s Embalming and Funeral Directors Act . . . asserting 
that the statute denied them the right to make and retail caskets to 
the Louisiana public.”112 The district court held that the Act’s rules 
and regulations granting the exclusive right to sell caskets to 
funeral directors were unconstitutional as a denial of equal 
protection and due process of law.113 The State Board appealed the 
district court’s decision.114 
B. Opinion of the Fifth Circuit 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of the 
Act and affirmed the lower district court decision invalidating the 
regulation.115 First, the court expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in Powers v. Harris that pure economic protectionism is a 
legitimate government purpose.116 Second, the court reviewed and 
ultimately rejected Louisiana’s proffered justifications of public 
health and safety and consumer protectionism in light of the Act’s 
history and structure.117 Finally, the court did not propose any 
hypothetical justifications and was unable to find a rational basis 
for the Act.118  
1. Pure Economic Protectionism Is Not a Legitimate 
Government Interest 
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding 
in Powers v. Harris that pure economic protectionism of a discrete 
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industry is a legitimate state interest.119 In support, the court 
referenced Powers’ concurring opinion and the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding in Craigmiles v. Giles.120 In Powers’ concurring opinion, 
Judge Tymkovich rejected pure economic protectionism as a valid 
governmental interest but was persuaded that the state had otherwise 
identified a sufficient public purpose.121 The Fifth Circuit also 
highlighted the Sixth Circuit’s similar rejection of pure economic 
protectionism as a rational basis for casket regulations.122 Next, the 
court carefully examined Powers’ majority opinion, which stated 
that “the Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or 
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal 
constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.”123 
The court rejected Powers’ contentions as an erroneous application 
of Supreme Court precedent.124 According to the Fifth Circuit, the 
correct observation of the Court’s precedent is that economic 
protectionism “is not an illegitimate interest when protection of the 
industry can be linked to advancement of the public interest or 
general welfare.”125 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged cases where 
the state regulations at issue may have been partly motivated by 
economic protectionism; however, the court reasoned that in those 
cases the regulations advanced some public purpose connected to 
the state’s protectionist motivations.126 
2. No Rational Relationship Between the Means and the End  
Second, the Fifth Circuit reviewed and rejected the state’s 
rationalization of public health and safety and consumer 
protectionism in light of the Act’s history and setting.127 The court 
followed Williamson’s application of the rational basis test, which 
instructs courts to consider post hoc rationales to find a rational 
basis for a challenged law.128 Recognizing the deference afforded 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. at 222–23. 
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 121. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring). 
 122. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222. 
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under Williamson, the court stressed that “a hypothetical rationale, 
even post hoc, cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board’s chosen 
means must rationally relate to the state interests it articulates.”129 
The court rejected the state’s consumer protection rationale, 
relying on two important facts: (1) “whatever special expertise a 
funeral director may have in casket selection is irrelevant to it 
being the sole seller of caskets”;130 and (2) “Louisiana’s Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law already polices 
inappropriate sales tactics by all sellers of caskets.”131  
After examining the Act itself, the court highlighted the only 
limitation governing the sale of caskets: the exclusive grant of 
intrastate casket sales to funeral directors.132 Just like the law in 
Craigmiles v. Giles, Louisiana law does not require a person to be 
buried in a casket; restrict intrastate casket purchases from out of 
state retailers; or enforce any requirements on intrastate casket 
retailers regarding casket size, design, material, or price.133 The 
court also reviewed the state’s purported goal of consumer 
protection in connection with existing Louisiana law, specifically 
Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
law.134 The court found that the law already adequately regulates 
unfair trade practices in casket sales, thereby protecting consumers 
against fraud and deception.135 Because Louisiana law lacks any 
requirements regarding the construction and design of caskets, the 
special expertise of casket retailers, and the prerequisite imposing 
the use of caskets for burial, the Fifth Circuit similarly rejected the 
state’s proffered justification of consumer protection.136  
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3. No Conceivable Post Hoc Rationales  
Third, the court did not propose any hypothetical justifications 
for the licensure requirements, because it could not ascertain any 
conceivable rational basis for the Act not articulated by the State 
Board.137 The court indicated “although rational basis review 
places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, 
plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for 
the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”138 As a result, the 
court could not find a rational relationship between the Act and 
consumer protectionism or public health and safety, because the 
state’s plausible rationales were “betrayed by the undisputed facts” 
set forth by the Abbey.139  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
From the butchers and bakers, to the casket makers, the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille is a constitutional 
landmark for a country that has struggled to find the proper 
balance between government regulations and economic liberties.140 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding influences the course of future 
economic legislation, particularly in Louisiana, and questions the 
validity of laws and regulations already in place.141 The Fifth 
Circuit’s decision may face a crowd of critics fearing a return to 
Lochner-ism and the emergence of a “second order” rational basis 
review;142 however, the court’s decision is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent and the very constitutional principles 
that influenced the Framers of the Constitution. From the 
unforgiving scrutiny of Lochner to the utmost deference of 
Williamson, the Court has consistently required a minimum 
standard of rationality in determining the constitutionality of 
economic legislation.143 The Supreme Court’s precedent equally 
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reveals the Court’s unwavering suspicion of protectionist laws and 
its concern for safeguarding economic liberties.144 Amidst the 
Supreme Court’s numerous formulations of rational basis review, 
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion revitalizes the rationality standard by 
adding critical language to the framework established in Carolene 
Products and Williamson.145 All courts should follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s model analysis of due process and equal protection 
claims so that aspiring businesspersons can pursue an honest living 
free from arbitrary governmental interference. 
A. Return to Constitutional Principles and Precedent  
1. The Fifth Circuit Held that Pure Economic Protectionism Is 
Not a Legitimate Governmental Interest 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit’s proposition that 
pure economic protectionism of a particular industry is a legitimate 
state interest.146 According to Supreme Court precedent, 
“protecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an 
illegitimate interest when protection of the industry can be linked 
to advancement of the public interest or general welfare.”147 At the 
heart of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause is 
a fear of the government’s arbitrary interference with economic 
liberties.148 As the Abbey’s attorney observed: 
[T]he very formulation of the rational basis test—a rational 
relationship with a legitimate government interest—precludes 
a government interest that is nothing more than private 
favoritism. To be “equally protected” by the laws necessarily 
means that the government will not arbitrarily extend special 
favors to one group to the detriment of another.149 
The attorney’s observation reflects Justice Field’s pre-Lochner 
vision of due process: “The great purpose of the requirement is to 
exclude everything that is arbitrary and capricious in legislation 
affecting the rights of the citizen.”150 
                                                                                                             
 144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14. 
 145. See supra Part I.C. 
 146. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222–23.  
 147. Id. at 222. 
 148. Id. at 222, 227. 
 149. Brief of Respondents–Appellees at 19, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 
F.3d 215 (5th Cir.) (No. 11-30756), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).  
 150. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1888) (upholding a state law 
which required physicians to hold a degree from a reputable medical college, 
pass an examination, or prove practice in West Virginia for the previous ten 




Returning to the spirit of natural law philosophers like Justice 
Field, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates a concern for 
protecting economic liberties, not a return to the Lochner era.151 The 
Lochner regime’s aggressive review of economic legislation was a 
result of the fundamental right status given to the freedom of 
contract.152 The Supreme Court abandoned such scrutiny of state 
regulations and the freedom-of-contract theory for a deferential 
analysis of legislative choices.153 Nevertheless, the Court purposefully 
preserved measures to protect individuals from arbitrary 
governmental interference. The Fifth Circuit noted that none of the 
Supreme Court cases accepted the contention that protecting or 
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal 
constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.154 
The Supreme Court consistently reiterates notions that “[s]tates are 
accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies,” 
“the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature,”155 and “[s]tates ‘have 
[the] power to legislate against what are found to be injurious 
practices in their internal commercial and business affairs.’”156 
However, the Supreme Court has similarly reiterated that the rational 
basis requirement is meant to protect individuals’ economic liberty 
from arbitrary governmental interference and check the legislature 
within the confines of its Article III discretion.157  
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that economic protectionism is not 
a legitimate state interest standing alone but may be validated by a 
post hoc perceived rationale.158 In Williamson, “the coloration of 
wealth transfer to ophthalmologists and optometrists” was balanced 
by the post hoc rationale of public health.159 Similarly, in City of 
New Orleans v. Dukes, the Supreme Court concluded that the state 
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regulation was “a means to preserve the appearance and custom 
valued by the Quarter’s residents and attractive to tourists.”160 In 
Williamson and Dukes, the challenged regulations effectively 
shielded a particular industry or group from economic competition; 
however, despite likely protectionist interests, the Supreme Court 
found that the state was furthering other legitimate state interests in 
both instances.161  
Other circuits confirm that naked economic preferences are 
impermissible to the extent that they harm consumers.162 The Ninth 
Circuit in Merrifield v. Lockyer emphasized that protectionism 
might be allowed if coupled with a legitimate state interest:  
[T]here might be instances when economic protectionism 
might be related to a legitimate governmental interest and 
survive rational basis review.163 However, economic 
protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to 
the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a 
legitimate governmental interest.164  
Because the Merrifield occupational licensing regulation was solely 
advancing the illegitimate interest of pure economic protectionism, 
the Ninth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional.165 
With the rise and fall of economic substantive due process, 
there is a theme embraced by the natural law philosophers, the 
Lochner era’s judicial activists, and the Williamson deferentialists, 
and it survives today. At a minimum, the Court has consistently 
held economic legislation to a standard of rationality.166 If pure 
economic protectionism were a legitimate governmental objective, 
the rational basis requirement would be depleted and the outer 
most limits of due process and equal protection diminished.167 The 
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power to regulate would be limitless. The purpose of government 
power is to advance public interests.168 The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection and due process guarantees are constitutional 
checks on the legislature to ensure legitimate state objectives and 
prevent irrational governmental interference.169 If public power can 
be used to protect purely private interests, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s limitations on states’ powers are meaningless. As a 
result, the Fifth Circuit rejected both Louisiana’s regulation and the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling that economic protectionism is a legitimate 
state interest.170 
2. The Fifth Circuit Found that No Rational Relationship Exists 
Between the Casket Regulations and Louisiana’s Interest in 
Consumer Protection, Public Health, and Public Safety 
The Fifth Circuit found no rational relationship between the 
casket regulations and a legitimate governmental objective because 
there was none.171 Under Williamson, state legislation will be 
upheld against constitutional attack as long as there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for the challenged law;172 however, the Fifth Circuit opinion 
indicated that the court’s “analysis does not proceed with 
abstraction for hypothesized ends and means do not include post 
hoc hypothesized facts.”173 The Fifth Circuit echoed Carolene 
Products, which declared that legislation is “not to be pronounced 
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or 
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”174 The burden is on 
one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the 
legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.175  
Plaintiffs challenging state economic regulations appear to 
carry a heavy burden; however, the monks carried a relatively 
painless burden, because the evidence negated any logical support 
for the casket regulations.176 The undisputed facts destroyed any 
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rational relationship between Louisiana’s law and a legitimate 
governmental interest: Louisiana consumers can purchase caskets 
from any retailer in the United States except non-licensed retailers 
in Louisiana.177 In Louisiana, one can buy a casket online from an 
inexperienced, uneducated casket maker but cannot purchase a 
hand-crafted casket from the monks of St. Joseph Abbey due to 
supposed safety and health concerns.178  
The Fifth Circuit searched for a rational relationship between 
Louisiana’s statutory scheme and the state’s goals of public health 
and safety and consumer protection.179 Although the Louisiana law 
was presumed constitutional, the Abbey successfully met its burden 
and provided sufficient evidence to support the finding that the 
legislation was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.180 St. Joseph 
Abbey is distinguishable from Williamson, where the plaintiffs failed 
to rebut every conceivable post hoc rationale of the regulation.181 
Although the state presented legitimate purposes for the casket 
regulations, the court properly found that the history of the Act and 
the absence of other state regulations governing the construction and 
design of caskets and out-of-state casket retailers diminished any 
rational connection between Louisiana’s means and ends.182 
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that there was 
not a rational basis for Louisiana’s casket regulations. 
B. Revitalization of Rationality  
Amidst the Supreme Court’s numerous formulations of rational 
basis review, the Fifth Circuit opinion revitalizes the rationality 
standard by adding critical language to the framework established 
in Carolene Products.183 In Williamson, the Supreme Court 
initiated misconceptions of the judicial deference once given to 
state economic legislation.184 The Supreme Court in Williamson 
noted that “[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, 
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may 
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school 
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of thought.”185 The deferential approach in Williamson is 
commonly misconstrued to provide an automatic validation of 
legislation under rational basis review.186 The Fifth Circuit follows 
the spirit of Williamson but makes a significant clarification: “The 
great deference due state economic regulation does not demand 
judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of 
its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical 
explanations for regulation.”187 Using the phrases “judicial blindness” 
and “nonsensical explanations,” the Fifth Circuit implied that the 
rational basis test is much more than a judicial rubber stamp or 
mechanical test.188  
Revitalizing the rationality standard of rational basis review, 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision is a model example of proper due 
process and equal protection analysis of state economic legislation. 
The predominant requirements of the rational basis test are two-
fold, but the Fifth Circuit provided a more detailed framework.189 
First, courts must identify a legitimate governmental purpose.190 
Courts accept as legitimate all objectives within the state’s police 
power, including public health, public safety, and general welfare 
interests.191 Considering legitimate governmental objectives for the 
law, courts may also consider post hoc rationales—meaning 
conceivable rationales the state could have provided.192 Second, 
courts must evaluate the relationship between the state’s chosen 
means and the state’s articulated interests.193 Courts must consider 
the context and history of the challenged legislation, because even 
a post hoc rationale cannot be “fantasy.”194 Third, even if courts 
find a rational basis between the regulation and a legitimate state 
interest, they must look to the record to determine whether the 
rational basis is refuted by the evidence presented by the 
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plaintiffs.195 Where every conceivable rationale is contradicted, 
courts must invalidate the challenged law.196 
The Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational basis standard 
reflects Justice Field’s position in the pre-Lochner era.197 Justice 
Field supported the right of every citizen to follow his calling but 
maintained the importance of licensure requirements to ensure the 
necessary qualifications of learning and skill for certain 
professions.198 Justice Field exercised appropriate judicial restraint 
yet protected economic liberties, observing these rights as the 
“distinguishing feature of our republican institutions.”199 Moreover, 
he acknowledged the deference required for state judgment but, like 
the Fifth Circuit, did not stop there. Describing the constitutionality 
of licensing requirements, Justice Field stated:  
If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and 
attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to 
their validity can be raised because of their stringency or 
difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such 
calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable 
study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of 
his right to pursue a lawful vocation.200  
Justice Field and the Fifth Circuit demonstrated deference for 
the judgments of state legislatures and an understanding of the 
importance of occupational regulations; however, the Fifth Circuit 
opinion transformed Justice Field’s nineteenth-century articulation 
into accessible language for the twenty-first century. The opinion 
injected meaning back into the vague reiterations of due process 
analysis that drain the rational basis test of its only requirement: a 
rational basis.201 
Revitalizing the definitions previously formulated by courts, 
the Fifth Circuit emphasized the significance of the rational basis 
standard.202 Louisiana’s invalidated casket regulations reveal that 
states are not always rational and, more importantly, do not always 
win.203 Plaintiffs prevail when they present evidence that 
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deteriorates any logical connection between the challenged statutory 
scheme and any plausible legitimate rationale.204 Although the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
and constitutional principles, it is a reminder to all courts of two 
basic ideals. First, the government does not prevail simply by 
offering a general justification of public health, safety, or welfare.205 
Instead, when the government articulates a legitimate interest, there 
must be a factually plausible, logical connection between a 
legitimate interest and the challenged law.206 Second, plaintiffs can 
successfully negate plausible rationales for challenged legislation 
through an analysis of the statutory scheme and relevant evidence.207  
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
In the wake of Powers v. Harris, St. Joseph v. Abbey sends a 
warning to state legislatures: “The great deference due state 
economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness.”208 With 
a history of legislation regulating butchers, casket makers, and 
other professional industries, the Fifth Circuit’s message resonates 
most in Louisiana. 
A. A Warning to State Legislatures  
The Supreme Court has not invalidated a single piece of 
economic legislation on economic substantive due process grounds 
since the 1930s;209 however, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St. 
Joseph Abbey is an indication that not all state regulations will 
satisfy even “the outer-most limits of due process and equal 
protection.”210 St. Joseph Abbey is an exceptional case where the 
reality of the facts eliminated any potential rational connection 
between the casket regulations and a legitimate state interest.211 The 
                                                                                                             
 
https://www.ij.org/divine-justice-ij-case-on-behalf-of-monks-puts-lid-on-louisiana 
-casket-monopoly-2, archived at https://perma.cc/F4EH-PVBM (explaining the 
important precedential effect of the opinion in St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana and 
beyond regarding the vitality of economic laws). 
 204. See Castille, 712 F.3d at 223. 
 205. Id. at 226. 
 206. Id. at 226–27.  
 207. Id. at 222. 
 208. Id. at 226. 
 209. See supra Part I.C. 
 210. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227. 
 211. Robert Barnes, Louisiana Monks Go To Court To Sell Their Caskets, 
WASH. POST (May 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/louisian a-




president of the Institute for Justice, the Abbey’s representative, 
articulated three critical components to a successful suit: “outrageous 
facts,” “evil villains,” and “sympathetic clients.”212 Amidst the 
increasing number of licensure requirements for various 
professions, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion is a critical reminder to 
state legislatures that the power to regulate is not limitless.213 
Because courts following the Fifth Circuit’s opinion will not accept 
“fantasy” or “nonsensical explanations,” state legislatures should 
rethink future economic regulations, particularly those protectionist 
measures disguised as rationalizations of consumer protection and 
public health.214  
Louisiana’s irrational licensure requirements and protectionist 
motivations for regulating casket sales mimic the reality of 
licensing schemes in many states. Current licensing statutes govern 
an endless list of trades.215 Like Louisiana’s casket regulations, 
most licensing statutes impose a series of requirements that must 
be satisfied before granting entry into the profession.216 Masked as 
public safety or health measures, many licensing schemes are 
enacted to suppress competition.217 Licensing boards are normally 
“composed of members of the regulated occupation, thereby 
endowing established producers with the discretion to exclude their 
own potential competitors.”218 Similarly, the Louisiana casket 
regulations imposed extensive requirements on casket retailers 
forcing them to become licensed funeral directors to sell caskets.219 
Moreover, the nine-member State Board, the entity responsible for 
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enforcing the regulations, has only one representative who is not 
affiliated with the funeral industry.220  
Considering the relationship of Louisiana’s casket regulations 
and licensing schemes more generally, the timing of the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision is significant. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is only 
one of a handful of decisions since the New Deal to protect 
economic liberty.221 As a result, the Fifth Circuit’s decision sets 
critical precedent for future challenges of economic legislation.222  
B. The Validity of Louisiana Licensure Requirements  
The Supreme Court rejected the State Board’s petition for 
review, so the Fifth Circuit’s ruling survives as vitally important 
precedent for the protection of economic liberty.223 The opinion 
serves as a platform to challenge other irrational licensing schemes. 
Consequently, the decision will likely influence the construction of 
future economic legislation and will have an equally profound effect 
on current regulations in Louisiana.224 The Fifth Circuit’s decision 
strays from previous Louisiana jurisprudence on the constitutionality 
of professional licensure requirements.225 Louisiana district courts 
have upheld many laws similar to Louisiana’s casket regulations.226 
As a result of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the validity of Louisiana’s 
economic laws which once passed constitutional muster may now be 
questioned.227  
Louisiana is home to various licensure requirements governing a 
wide range of professions.228 Like the casket regulations, these laws 
suffered constitutional attack. In Meadows v. Odom, Louisiana’s 
florist licensing requirements were challenged.229 The plaintiffs 
included would-be florists who were unable to pass the highly 
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subjective state-mandated exam graded by existing florists.230 
Following the Tenth Circuit’s logic in Powers, the district court 
upheld the legislation and found that the floral licensing examination 
was rationally related to a legitimate government interest in 
regulating the profession.231 First, the court found that the licensure 
qualifications had a rational connection with the applicants’ “fitness 
or capacity to serve in that trade or profession.”232 Second, the court 
concluded that the floral examination was rationally related to the 
government interest of public welfare and safety.233 The court was 
satisfied with the state’s proffered justification to ensure florist 
arrangements were assembled properly in a manner least likely to 
cause harm to consumers.234  
Despite the district court’s decision in Meadows, the Louisiana 
State Legislature repealed some of the most arbitrary and 
subjective components of the licensing scheme;235 however, the 
Meadows court would have likely ruled differently and eliminated 
the arbitrary florist licensing requirements if it had the insight of 
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey.236 The florist and 
casket regulations are very similar in their lengthy examination 
requirements and hefty penalties.237 Like the casket laws, the 
florist requirements appeared to be purely protectionist 
measures.238 Furthermore, the relationship between the imposed 
qualifications and the public safety interests appear equally 
attenuated.239 Applying the logic of the Fifth Circuit, the state’s 
interest in protecting consumers from injuries would not be enough 
to satisfy even the deferential rational basis test.240  
In addition to the florist licensure requirements, Louisiana has 
laws regulating various other occupations, such as hair braiding, 
teeth whitening, and food truck vendors.241 Applying the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning in St. Joseph Abbey, the validity of these 
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licensing laws is questionable.242 For example, Louisiana is one 
out of ten remaining states to have a specialized license for hair 
braiders.243 Louisiana law requires 1,000 hours of training and 
education to become a licensed hair braider.244 An artistic tradition 
passed down from generation to generation, hair braiding—much 
like making caskets and arranging flowers—is not an activity 
deserving of such burdensome regulations.245 As a result, these 
demanding licensing requirements appear solely to protect the 
industry from competition, which standing alone is not enough 
under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.246 
The Fifth Circuit opinion is especially important in Louisiana, 
where the very words of the Louisiana Constitution seem to have 
been forgotten. The Preamble of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution 
begins by stating: “We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to 
Almighty God for the civil, political, economic, and religious 
liberties we enjoy, and desiring to protect individual rights to life, 
liberty, and property.”247 The preamble explicitly states that the 
people of Louisiana enjoy economic liberties.248 Considering the 
very language of the Louisiana Constitution, it is challenging to 
reconcile the fact that the same state gave birth to some of the 
nation’s most arbitrary laws, which regulate butchers and casket 
makers. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Constitution supports the Fifth 
Circuit’s determination that pure economic protectionism is not a 
legitimate governmental interest;249 accepting such a proposition 
would allow arbitrary interferences with individuals’ economic 
liberties, rights enjoyed by Louisiana’s citizens.250  
C. A Final Victory for the Monks 
The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the State Board’s 
petition for review is a final victory for the monks of St. Joseph 
Abbey.251 The denial leaves for another day the Supreme Court’s 
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answer to the question this Note explores: whether pure economic 
protectionism is a legitimate governmental interest.252 Plainly, 
there is a conflict that must be resolved by the Supreme Court in the 
future, and the State Board’s petition anticipates future challenges;253 
surely a similar crowd of Louisiana-born entrepreneurs will return to 
the Court’s steps. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision 
provides the much-needed relief for the monks who will be able to 
legally sell their handcrafted caskets free from the State Board’s 
scrutiny.254 In addition, the monks’ success provides hope to other 
entrepreneurs burdened by protectionist licensing requirements.255  
Although a victory for the monks, the circuit split remains.256 
Rejecting the State Board’s petition, the Supreme Court 
simultaneously scrapped the opportunity to expressly reject the 
contention that pure economic protectionism is a legitimate state 
interest and establish the first instance since the 1930s where the 
Court invalidated economic legislation on due process and equal 
protection grounds.257 Until the Supreme Court speaks on the 
issue, courts will struggle with whether to accept pure economic 
protection of an industry as a sufficient rational basis for economic 
regulation. Moreover, with the Tenth Circuit decision still intact, 
states are better equipped to eliminate the labor of disguising 
protectionist measures as legitimate public health and safety tools 
and pass laws for the sole benefit of protecting one group at the 
expense of another.258 The Tenth Circuit’s validation of pure 
economic protectionism since 2004 produced a dangerous loophole 
that allowed states to enact legislation that escapes the very 
purpose of rational basis review.259 As states continue to pass 
groundless laws unsupported by any public interest, the Supreme 
Court will one day have to put the issue to rest once and for all.  
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The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the State Board’s 
request to overturn the ruling in St. Joseph Abbey is a final victory 
for the Benedictine monks and provides hope for the butchers, 
bakers, and casket makers alike in their quest to make an honest 
living. While the circuit split remains, the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in St. Joseph Abbey revives the protection of economic liberties 
and defends against southern capitalists who have haunted the 
economy since the Slaughter-House Cases.260 The rejection of 
pure economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s deeply rooted safeguards 
against arbitrary governmental interference.261 Moreover, the 
decision is harmonious with constitutional principles and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence aimed to protect the rights of citizens to 
pursue a livelihood.262 The lawsuit’s attention did exactly what the 
State Board adamantly fought against and more.263 Engulfed by the 
courtroom spotlight, the monks reclaimed their right to sell caskets 
in Louisiana and increased public demand for their handcrafted 
work.264 Finally, the monks left their quiet lifestyle to fight for 
their calling, ora et labora—“prayer and work.”265 
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